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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joseph Hillenbrand has challenged his judgment of conviction and sentence for
possession of methamphetamine on four grounds, two of which warrant further discussion here.
As to Mr. Hillenbrand’s claim that the district court erred by allowing Officer Childers to testify
that only ten percent of drivers get as nervous as Mr. Hillenbrand when asked about drugs, and
that almost all of that ten percent in fact had drugs, the State responds that Mr. Hillenbrand failed
to preserve that issue, that he loses it on the merits, and that any error was harmless. With
respect to Mr. Hillenbrand’s claim that the court abused its discretion by allowing Officer Otto to
testify, the State counters that Officer Otto was “effectively” disclosed, that Mr. Hillenbrand
conceded as much, and that any abuse of discretion was harmless. These arguments miss the
mark. This Court should vacate Mr. Hillenbrand’s judgment of conviction and remand this case
to the district court.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by allowing Officer Childers to testify that only ten percent of
drivers get as nervous as Mr. Hillenbrand when asked about drugs, and that almost all of
them in fact had drugs, because that testimony lacked a proper foundation and was not
relevant?

II.

Because the State never disclosed Officer Otto as a witness, did the district court abuse its
discretion by allowing him to testify?

III.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Hillenbrand’s motion for a mistrial after Officer
Otto testified that the State had charged him with a felony?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Hillenbrand to complete onehundred and fifty hours of community service?

2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Allowing Officer Childers To Testify That Only Ten Percent Of
Drivers Get As Nervous As Mr. Hillenbrand When Asked About Drugs, And That Almost All
Of That Ten Percent In Fact Had Drugs, Because That Testimony Lacked A Proper Foundation
And Was Not Relevant

A.

Mr. Hillenbrand Has Properly Raised This Issue On Appeal
The State attempts to prevent this Court from reaching the merits of Mr. Hillenbrand’s

claim by arguing that his foundation objection did not adequately preserve this issue under
I.R.E. 702 and that he cannot challenge Officer Childers’ second statement because he did not
object to it individually. (Resp. Br., pp.12–14.) Those arguments are without merit.
First, Mr. Hillenbrand’s foundation objection adequately preserved this issue. “For an
objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the objection must
be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context.” State v.
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 601–02 (2013). Mr. Hillenbrand’s foundation objection, combined
with the context provided by the question asked—“what percentage becomes extra nervous when
you ask them about drugs?”—make the basis of that objection apparent. (Tr., p.139, L.25–p.141,
L.1.) Mr. Hillenbrand objected to Officer Childers comparison between Mr. Hillenbrand and
other drivers because that testimony passed itself off as an expert opinion without providing an
adequate foundation.
Second, Mr. Hillenbrand properly challenged Officer Childers’ second statement on
appeal. Officer Childers could not have provided that second statement—“of the percentage,
almost all of them,”—if the court had properly excluded the first statement—that “[m]aybe 10
percent of the people get that nervous about it.” (Tr., p.139, L.25–p.141, L.1 (emphasis added).)
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B.

The State Has Failed To Show The Testimony Was Admissible
The State makes no attempt to actually address the merits of Mr. Hillenbrand’s argument

that Officer Childers’ testimony was not admissible because it lacked an adequate foundation
and was not relevant. Instead, the State posits that defense counsel opened the door—which was
the only ground for admissibility provided below—and that the testimony was a lay opinion
under I.R.E. 701. Both arguments are unavailing.
As an initial matter, the State incorrectly asserts that Mr. Hillenbrand “reasonably opened
the door” to the challenged testimony. (Resp. Br., pp.14–15.) To the contrary, defense counsel
asked, “[w]ould you agree that an individual can become typically nervous when suddenly asked
about something like drugs for example?” a question which in no way calls for a comparison
between Mr. Hillenbrand and other drivers. (Tr., p.119, L.17–p.120, L.1 (emphasis added).)
And although defense counsel could have clarified the question or objected to Officer Childers’
testimony as unresponsive, she did not open the door by failing to do so. Finally, even if defense
counsel had “opened the door,” Officer Childers’ testimony was still inadmissible because it
lacked an adequate foundation.
The State next argues that the testimony was admissible as a lay opinion under
I.R.E. 701, though acknowledging that neither the State argued nor the court concluded as much.
(Resp. Br., pp.16–18.) Therefore, I.R.E. 701 cannot form the basis for affirming the district
court’s decision. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (“Issues not raised below will not
be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the
case was presented to the lower court.”) (quoting State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275
(2017)) (emphasis added); State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 416 P.3d 957, 963 (2018) (same);
State v. Akins, 164 Idaho 74, 423 P.3d 1026, 1034 (2018). Moreover, because Officer Childers’
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testimony was not helpful to understanding his testimony or determining a fact in issue (see App.
Br., pp.10–11), was based in part on specialized knowledge within the scope of I.R.E. 702 (see
id., pp.9–10), and certainly passed itself off as expert testimony by virtue of Officer Childers’
use of statistics (see id.), it was not admissible as a lay opinion. See I.R.E. 701.

C.

The State Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving This Error Harmless Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt
When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears

the burden of proving, “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.’”

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010)

(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Under Chapman, an error is harmless
if the government can prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the
jury’s verdict. Id. “[T]he issue under Chapman is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on
evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of” the
inadmissible evidence. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). “The inquiry, in other words,
is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable
to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added).
To begin, the State relies at times on an incorrect standard by arguing about “whether the
jury would have reached the same result absent the challenged testimony.”1 (Resp., Br., p.20
(emphasis added); see also see id., p.19 (There is no reasonable possibility that Officer Childers’
first opinion might have contributed to Hillenbrand’s conviction . . . .”) (emphasis added).)

1

The State relied on the same incorrect standard when addressing harmlessness in Issue III,
which deals with the district court’s refusal to declare a mistrial after Officer Otto told the jury
that Mr. Hillenbrand was charged with a felony. (See Resp. Br., p.30.)
5

Though the Idaho Supreme Court has on occasion used language that could be read as endorsing
this “hypothetical jury” analysis, see id., p.19 (quoting State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44
(2017), and State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013), for the proposition that “the error is
harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error.”) (emphasis
added)), the correct standard is that articulated in Chapman and adopted by Perry, see 150 Idaho
at 227 (“If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, appellate
courts shall employ the harmless error test articulated in Chapman. Where the defendant meets
his initial burden of showing that a violation occurred, the State then has the burden of
demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation
did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.”) (emphasis added).
Further, the State has failed to meet this burden. Officer Childers’ second statement in
particular—that of the ten percent of drivers that got as nervous as Mr. Hillenbrand when asked
about drugs, “almost all of them” ended up having drugs (Tr., p.139, L.25–p.141, L.1)—surely
contributed to the verdict. That testimony painted Mr. Hillenbrand’s guilt as near-certain, when
the remaining evidence against him was far from conclusive, and thus the jury surely weighed
that testimony against him.

II.
Because The State Never Disclosed Officer Otto As A Witness, The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Allowing Him To Testify
The State seems to acknowledge that it did not comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6)
when it failed to name Officer Otto as a potential trial witness, but asserts that it “effectively”
disclosed Officer Otto and that defense counsel conceded as much. (Resp. Br., p.22.) It goes on
to argue that, even if the district court did abuse its discretion by allowing Officer Otto to testify,
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this Court should affirm that decision because Mr. Hillenbrand has not met his burden of
showing there was “a reasonable probability that, but for the late disclosure of evidence, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”

(Id.)

The State’s arguments are

unpersuasive—the first two rely on a strained reading of the record, while the latter misstates the
law.

A.

The State Did Not Actually Or “Effectively” Disclose Officer Otto As A Witness Under
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(B)(6), And Defense Counsel Did Not Concede As Much
The State’s assertion that it “effectively disclosed Officer Otto as a potential witness at

trial” is telling. (Id. (emphasis added); see also id., pp.23–25.) Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6)
requires that “the prosecuting attorney . . . furnish to the defendant a written list of the names and
addresses of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as
witnesses at the trial . . . .” (Emphasis added). The State provided a witness and exhibit list to
Mr. Hillenbrand, which included the names of four witnesses, but not Officer Otto’s name.
(Aug., pp.22, 58.) Thus, simply put, the State did not comply with the rule. That the State also
included later in that disclosure a statement that it might call any other witness listed in the
reports does not relieve the State of its duty to actually put the defense on notice of who it
intended to call. (See Resp. Br., pp.23–24.)
For the same reasons, the State’s claim that Mr. Hillenbrand conceded that Officer Otto
was disclosed as a witness by acknowledging that his name appeared in discovery is without
merit. (Id., p.23.) To conclude as much would require defendants to be prepared to cross
examine anyone who came up in discovery, would render I.C.R. 16(b)(6)’s disclosure
requirement a nullity, and would defeat the underlying purpose of the discovery rules. State v.
Morin, 158 Idaho 622, 626 (Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that the discovery rules “‘promote
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fairness and candor,’ ‘facilitate fair and expedient pretrial fact gathering,’ and ‘prevent surprise
at trial.’”) (quoting Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873–78 (2006)). The State did not name
Officer Otto in its witness list, and thus failed to comply with I.C.R. 16(b)(6).

B.

The State, Which Relied On A Pre-Perry Harmlessness Standard To Argue That
Mr. Hillenbrand Had Not Met His Burden Of Proving The Error Was Not Harmless, Has
Not And Could Not Have Met Its Burden Of Proving This Error Was Harmless Beyond
A Reasonable Doubt
The State asserts that, even if the court did abuse its discretion by allowing Officer Otto

to testify, this Court should affirm that decision because Mr. Hillenbrand has not met his burden
of showing there was “a reasonable probability that, but for the late disclosure of evidence, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Resp. Br., p.22 (citing State v. Pacheco,
134 Idaho 367, 370 (Ct. App. 2000), and State v. Spradlin, 119 Idaho 1030, 1034 (Ct. App.
1991)), p.26 (Mr. Hillenbrand “does not explain how Officer Otto’s testimony about
Mr. Zubieta’s passive role in the incident could have been discredited through crossexamination, or how the outcome of the trial would have been different, had the state specifically
disclosed the officer as a witness on its witness list.”).) The State has relied on the wrong
harmless error standard and thus has failed to meet its burden of showing the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. 2
As the Idaho Supreme Court made clear in Perry, and reaffirmed in the context of a
witness disclosure violation in State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017),3 “[a]

2

At the same time, the State’s argument considers the effect of the incorrect error. (See Resp.
Br., p.26.) The issue is not whether the result would have been different if the State had properly
disclosed Officer Otto, but whether the court’s erroneous decision to allow Officer Otto to testify
contributed to the verdict.
3
Montgomery went on to cite State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013), for the proposition
that “the error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error.”
As discussed above, the inquiry is not whether a hypothetical jury would have reached the same
8

defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to
establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(Quoting Perry,

150 Idaho at 222). The State’s cursory discussion of why Mr. Hillenbrand failed to meet his
supposed burden is insufficient to meet the State’s burden of showing, beyond a reasonable
doubt, “that the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the
error.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added).
Even if the State had analyzed this issue using the proper standard, it could not have
proven the error harmless. Officer Otto’s testimony surely contributed to the verdict in this case
because he filled a very important gap in the State’s narrative. Officer Otto was the only officer
who stayed with Mr. Hillenbrand and Mr. Zubieta while Officer Schouman went to his patrol car
to run their information through dispatch and Officer Childers went to his patrol car to get his
drug dog. (Tr., p.96, Ls.3–13, p.124, Ls.1–21, p.146, Ls.8–18, p.203, Ls.4–14.) The State asked
Officer Otto a long, pointed series of questions aimed at ruling out the possibility that
Mr. Zubieta placed the baggie under Mr. Hillenbrand’s seat. (Tr., p.203, L.15–p.205, L.4.) In
response to those questions, Officer Otto testified that he stood by the passenger side door while
the other officers went to their patrol cars, he had an unobstructed view of Mr. Zubieta,
Mr. Zubieta had his hands on the dashboard the entire time, and Mr. Zubieta never did anything
unusual or suspicious.

(Tr., p.203, L.15–p.205, L.4.)

His testimony went to the core of

Mr. Hillenbrand’s defense—that the baggie belonged to Mr. Zubieta or a previous passenger.
And absent that testimony, the jury would not have known what Mr. Zubieta had done during

result absent the error, but whether the error actually contributed to the jury’s verdict in this case.
See supra pp.5–6; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.
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that time or whether he had placed the baggie under Mr. Hillenbrand’s seat. Therefore, had the
State attempted to meet its burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
it would have failed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hillenbrand respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and remand for a new trial, or, alternatively, for a new hearing to determine the appropriate
amount of community service.
DATED this 25th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of October, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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